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Abstract 
Traditionally, the weakness of the European Parliament and of 
European political parties is presented as a central cause of the 
European Community's legitimacy crisis. This article suggests an 
alternative reading ofthe situation. Not only is the legitimacy crisis 
much more complex than is generally believed, but the 
strengthening of the Parliament, and the development or parij 
poliiics71tafwoula ensue~mtgni ultiiiiafeiY tlireifeJitlje ·stabilitY of 
, "fhe coiiiiiiiiziiijr llie-iijierience of parliamentary federations 
suggestS~ that the majoritarian features of the parliamentary system 
may be a source of tension. No matter how necessary the 
democratization of the EC's institutional setting may be, reforms 
must not be detrimental to the quality of centre-periphery r';zaiioiiS. 
With the conclusion of the Single European Act, it can be said that the 
European Community (EC)1 has entered into an era of what one Canadian 
scholar has called "mega-constitutional politics": a phase~~f ~lllajor constitutional 
transformations, in which discussions on institutional issues absorb a substantial 
-=--.......____ ____ ,~--~- _..,. -
part of the political system's energy.2 The EC has gone through two major 
~ 
institutional overhauls - the Single Act and the Maastricht Treaty - in less than 
ten years, and a third one is already scheduled for 1996. Issues such as the 
proper use of the subsidiarity principle, or the role of national parliaments in the 
decison-making process, recurrently re-emerge at the forefront of the political 
debate. Major political leaders and parties have felt it necessary to make their 
views on the future of the community known.3 
So far, w~~neye!the guestion of the EC's legitimacy has been addressed in 
~cadernic literature, ~!t~~~on ~as unavoidably focussed on the European 
_]'arliament. Its ;:ve~e__ss" has been seen as the root of the problem, . and its 
_strengthelling_ as the main ~E!~ for the evils of the Community. 
\ 
In my view, this line of analysis ~!~ll:tisf~ctory; On the one hand, the 
legitimacy crisis of the EC is much more complex - and hence more difficult to 
solve - than is traditionally thought. On the other, the discussion has often 
suffered from a lack of critical distance: A comparative analysis would suggest 
that in fact, if not in law, .the European Parliament is often better off than its 
national counterparts. Moreover, _insufficient attention has been paid to the 
specific nature of the EC, which is not - nor is it called upon to become- a 
state.4 Given this sui generis character, it could be argued that tlle_.strengthening 
of the European Parliament and of European parties, far from solving the current 
J~gi~~~y-crisis, as is often alleged, might in some respects aggravate it. Indeed, 
the experience of parliamentary federations suggests that the majoritarian 
features of parliamentary systems are often detrimental to centre-periphery 
relations. The negative features of majoritarianism are likely to be accentuated 
in a divided power system such as the EC. These two arguments are developed 
in the following pages. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 attempts to show that the EC has 
moved away from the somewhat formalist model of state legitimacy which 
doriuated its first thirty years of existence. Section 2 discusses the "classical" 
analysis of the democratic deficit, which has influenced many proposals of 
institutional reform. Section 3 reviews the changes in the Parliament's position 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and tries to anticipate what their 
implications might be on relations between the Community and its Member 
States. Section 4 sketches an alternative, non-majoritarian .avenue for the reform 
of European institutions. 
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The Legitimacy Crisis of the Community. 
Is there a Legitimacy Crisis? 
It has long been held - and is still maintained by some - that the legitimacy of 
the Community is primarily~state-based. Like any international organization, the 
EC has been created by states and its actions are legitimated by their will. Do 
not the member-states, in the shape of the Council of Ministers occupy a central 
place in the Community's institutional structure? Do they not designate the 
members of the European executive? Is their agreement not necessary for most 
Community decisions? Such a view finds its intellectual roots in De Gaulle's 
well known scheme of an Europe of the States ("Europe des patries"): 
"ll ne peut y avoir d'autre Europe possible que celle des Etats, et cela en 
dehors des mythes, des fictions et des parades. Ce sont les Etats 
seulement qui ont cree la Communaute ... , qui lui donnent une realite et 
une efficacite".5 
On this premise, it has been argued that insofar as State organs are 
legitimate~ 
at regular intervals by universal suffrage, it can be concluded that the i 
Community itself indirectly benefits from this ballot-box legitimation. Some, like 1 
former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, have even argued that the best 
way to of enhancing the legitimacy of the European Community would be to 
strengthen intergovernmental organs like the European Council, since the latter 
is the "emanation of the democratic legitimacy of the States", as is it made up 
of the Heads of State and Govemment.6 
However, the relaunch of European integration with the internal market 
programme has revealed the ~_.¥~istic character of this line of argument. In fact, 
3 
l. 
for such an indirect legitimation scheme to function, several conditions must b7 
met. First of all, the decisions taken by the Community must be the genuine 
fruit of the collective will of the member-states - otherwise it is difficult to see 
with what authority the Union can claim to base its decisons on some kind of 
state legitimacy. It is further necessary that the electorate be given the 
opportunity, when national elections take place, to express an opinion on 
European issues. Short of this, the legitimacy of Community action would 
primarily be of a merely formal nature. 
Merely listing these conditions is sufficient to perceive how far removed they 
are from reality. Not only are the member-states often tempted to place the 
responsibility for unpopular decisions on European institutions, they have also 
witnessed the restriction of their powers of control with the move to majority 
voting in a certain number of areas laid down by the Single Act. 'W!t~n some of 
the member-states are outvoted, it becomes difficult to claim that the final 
decision rests on their collective will. The unreality of this inter-state framework --~ l________ -- - - -- -- -- -
becomes greater still when elections are examined. ~uropean issues are already 
singularly blurred in the European elections, which, as explained elsewhere in 
this issue, are above all an opportunity for wide-scale opinion polls on the 
popularity of the national governrnents. Although Europe has become a matter 
of contention in many national elections, the debate rarely goes beyond the level 
of shallow statements on the historical meaning or the future of the integration 
process. Issues relating to the substance of European policies - similar to the 
kind of issues people vote on in domestic elections - are conspicuous only by 
their absence. 
Despite these insufficiencies, the odds are that the question of the legitimation 
of the European political system would have remained purely academic had the 
4 
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Community concerned itself solely with quotas and tariff restrictions. Indeed, to 
the likely dismay of pro-European elites, the question never gained the status of 
a major political issue in the first three decades of existence of the EC. 
But the creation of the internal market would not have been possible without 
"flanking" policies, such as first the common agricultural policy or competition 
policy, and subsequently environmental or consumer protection, ~hi_ch affect 
l~I"_g~ nulllbers of citizens. The Community was also directed to turning its 
attention to social issues and monetary policy. At the same time, the remarkable 
marketing success of the 1992 programme and the charisma of Commission 
President Jacques Delors have suddenly enhanced the visibility of institutions 
that were long ignored by public opinion. An increasing number of European 
citizens have thus gradually become aware that unlike most international 
organizations, the Community c~ infl11en~e their daily lives, and that it is 
therefore necessary to take account of its decisions. Some social groupings -
farmers, fishermen, for instance - have long been aware of it. The Irish have 
learnt that EC could impinge upon their anti-abortion laws, the British that it 
could force them to reconsider their regulations on Sunday trading, the Germans 
that monetary union could possibly entail doing away with the Deutschmark. As 
the visibility of European politics increased, the question of the Union's 
legitimacy became more acute. 
The Maastricht Treaty served as a revelatory mechanism, in furnishing an 
opportunity for national public opinions to make themselves heard. This exercise 
'clearly indicated that the ~£t_legititll~til:lll __ o! t~e_initi~-~~gesno longer 
appeared to them to be appropriate given the development of Community 
activities. In countries where referenda were held, such as Denmark and France, 
large segments of public opinion voiced their discontent with the current 
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operation of the European political system. In other countries, the ratification 
debates revealed a similar uneasiness. 
To the question "is there a legitimacy deficit in the EC?", European opinion 
seems to have answered in the affirmative. We shall now try to see how this 
deficit can be explained - and possibly remedied. 
The Democracy Deficit(s): Theory and Practice 
The Democratic Deficit 
Of all the aspects of the legitimacy crisis of the Community, the democratic 
deficit is undoubtedly the most widely known. The European Parliament made 
of it one of its chief weapons of battle? As this concept is discussed at length 
in another contribution to this issue,8 I shall limit myself here to the few 
remarks that are necessary for the purpose of this article. 
The integration process involves, among other things, a transfer of legislative 
activity to the European level. Classical democracy deficit analysis starts from 
the premise that the role of parliaments in this process is reduced: most national 
parliaments .. intervene at best in the implementation phase, and Community 
Directives often do not leave them a significant margin of appreciation. At the 
same time, the European Parliament is far from possessing powers equivalent 
to those of its national counterparts, even if its situation has been appreciably 
improved in recent years. At present, the Parliament remains oddly excluded in 
certain areas (commercial policy, for example); it possesses only an indirect 
right of initiative and even in the framework of the co-decision procedure, its 
powers are only imperfectly aligned with those of the Council. 
6 
Thus, it is argued that, ~n the one hand; the 11ational assemblies are often 
prese11ted with a fait accompli, while on .. the other the European Parliament, 
although it has seen its political standing grow in the last decade, does not ~~t 
-enjoy the full range of powers accorded to the parliamentary assemblies in the 
European political systems. In other words, integration is realised by a 
dispossession of the national legislativ_e power~, which is only partly 
~~mpensated for by the emergence of the European Parliament. As Community 
legislation is mainly a product of the cooperation between the national and 
European administrations, one can say that in overall terms, European 
integration has led to a weakening of the legislative branc~, and to a 
strengthening of the executive.9 As a result, Community legislation is often 
devoid of the legitimacy which attaches to the decisions taken by representatives 
of the people. 
"Classical" democracy deficit theory, which has occupied a central place in' 
debates on the institutional evolution of the EC, suffers however from several 
flaws. It generally overestimates the importance of legislatures in national 
1 
systems. More importantly in the present context, it is inspired by-~ ;omewhat \., 
reductive view of democracy, which is implicitly equated.with the mere voting,'\ 
of laws by parliamentary assemblies. 
{I~ fact, even a vague familiarity with democratic theory (like my own) suffices 
I to underline mu1_tHact:tecl.namreofthe concept of democracy. It entails among 
other things the possibility for citizens to choose their rulers and to sanction 
them if their action is deemed inadequate. It also implies the possibility for 
voters to control what political leaders do - which, to say the least, is 
problematic in the European Community. Moreover, the legitimacy crisis is 
aggravated by structural features: European decision-making processes tend to 
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privilege the technical dimension of problems, rather than their political aspects 
- a phenomenon which I have labelled political deficit, for lack of a better 
expression. These three elements are analyzed in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
The Accountability Deficit 
In the European tradition, parliamentary assemblies play a central role in the 
designation of the government. In electing their representatives, citizens 
participate indirectly in the choice of those who will govern them. As a result, 
when they are unhappy with the policies pursued by their government, voters 
can express their discontent in the ballot box. 
For a long time, this fundamental aspect of all democratic systems has been 
absent at European level. Until the Maastricht Treaty, the designation of the 
Commission was the exclusive privilege of the national governments. True, the 
Commission could be censured by Parliament, but as the latter was deprived of 
any real power in the appointment process, this possibility was never used. The 
Council itself escapes all censure, even if its individual members can be 
subjected to parliamentary control in their home country. The only institution on 
which the electorate could have a direct influence was the European Parliament, 
which is widely reputed to be the most feeble of the political institutions of the 
European Community. Thus, the electorate have had no possibility of directly 
expressing their views on the actions of the principal European institutions - the 
I Commission and the Council. The latter could therefore operate without 
incurring any electoral sanction. This relative impunity has contributed to the 
creation of a yawning chasm between citizens and the European political system. 
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However, this situation could well change in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty. 
As will be analyzed in greater detail below, the Commissicm_,_]lenc~~orth, has to • 
obtain th~ investiture of the Parliament before i;~~--begin to function~ The 'I 
debate on the appointment of Mr. Delors' successor, former Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Jacques Sauter, has clearly shown that the Parliament fully intends to 
utilise this new power. Furthermore, its powers of control have been 
-~~~~~~ed, which should allow it to make its influence felt in a more constant 
way on day-to-day decisions. One cannot rule out the possibility that the 
European electorate may eventually become aware of this power shift. This 
might in turn prompt European parties ~-"~o~~ate .. _their candidates for top 
Brussels jobs. The question of the executive's composition could thus become 
one of the issues in European level elections, as it currently is at national level. 
In voting for one party, citizens will be able to express their preference for Mr. 
X or Ms. Y as head of the Commission and, subsequently, their opinion on that 
person's performance ill; office. Thus, the strengthening of Parliament's control 
over the Commission might well sow the seeds of a profound change, which 
may reduce the gap which currently exists between public opinion and European 
institutions. 
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The Transparency Deficit. 
If Maastricht has undoubtedly contributed to reducing to some extent the 
democratic deficit, its effects on the transparency of the Community system ar~ 
clearly less positive. The reflection of laborious compromise, the Treaty has_ 
multiplied decisional procedures, carefully measuring out the prerogatives of 
each institution. 
European citizens have already had difficulty in understanding certain 
pecularities of the European system, such as the primarily legislative role 
enjoyed by a body like the Council of Ministers, composed of members of 
national governments. They are now faced with the growing complexity of this 
system: no less than 21 different procedures can currently be used by European j institutions.10 In the field of environmental poli~y, for instance, ~our ~erent 
, procedures have been laid down in the Maastncht Treaty, not mcluding the 
I 
/ possibility of resort to Art.100A, the comer stone of the internal market. I Combined with the secrecy which still shrouds the work of the Council of 
I Ministers, 11 this institutional alchemy makes it somewhat unlikely that 
/ European citizens will be able to understand who is responsible for decisions j taken at European level. 
-..______ 
The system is even more opaque at the implementation level. Who can say with 
exactitude the number of commitees of experts in existence at European level? 
Who can vaunt their knowledge of the rules which govern their composition and 
mode of functioning? At best a handful of people. Yet, these committees are 
called upon to take a range of important decisions in areas which concern the 
daily life of each and every citizen. 
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This lack of transparency is at the root of the feeling of distance that most 
citizens attest to when speaking of the European institutions. In such a context, 
the idea of political accountability for decisions taken at European level is barely 
more than illusory. How can the voter be in a position to scrutinize actions at 
European level, if he is unaware of the roles alloted to the various institutions 
and how these institutions actually use their powerf Irrespective of the rights j 
citizens may be granted, short of a major effort to s~plify and publicise these 
institutions, they will not be in a position to exercize them in an effective 
manner. 
The Political Deficit. 
Legitimacy in the European Union also suffers from the way political debates 
unfold. National politics are characterised by a number of familiar landmarks. 
Debate is structured around some large themes: the relationship between 
freedom and solidarity, the tension between free market and redistributive 
policies, the left-right cleavage, etc .. The citizenship are relatively familiar with 
the most important rules of the political game (the majority-opposition dialectic) 
and they often know the principal actors (political parties, trade unions). Finally, 
a certain number of fora exist within which political debate can build up: the 
Parliament, naturally, but also, and to an increasing extent, the media. 
The contrast with the situation at European level is striking. Technical aspects 
often dominate the various issues at stake. Rightly or wrongly, public opinion 
does not often associate Europe with great societal debates. Political actors are 
weakly organised at European level; European parties cluster together many 
heterogeneous groups, united only by a relative discipline. As we have seen, the 
rules of the game are so complex that they are unknown to the general public. 
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Even supposing that genuine political debate could develop, it is difficult to see 
where it could take place. A real political arena is itself lacking: the Parliament 
has not yet emerged as a forum; as for the media, they often treat European 
issues as being of marginal interest. 
To what factors can we attribute this striking contrast between European and 
national levels? 
Several factors need to be taken into account. First, the European Community 
only disposes of limited competences. Its primary vocation was an economic 
one: to integrate the national economies into a single market. It has only 
gradually extended its activities into a number of neighbouring areas, by reason 
of the links which unite economic integration with sectoral policies such as 
social policy, environment policy or consumer protection. This encourages a 
prismatic approach to problems: many questions are approached in the light of 
their relationship with the internal market. Without doubt, this fragmentation of 
competences encourages neither a more global approach nor the starting of work 
on large societal projects. Consequently, discussion tends to cluster around the 
technical aspects of Community regulation. 
This tendency is reinforced by the diversity of the Community. Dominant values 
- in terms of social policy or of environmental protection, for example - vary 
from one country to another, and this is inevitably reflected in their regulatory 
policies. Economic interests, like political cultures, often differ. All of these 
elements contribute to the relative complexity of Community decision-making. 
The same can be said of institutional rules: unanimity is still sometimes 
required, and more than two thirds of the votes in the Council of Ministers are 
necessary to obtain a qualified majority. The decision-making process is thus, 
12 
to a large extent, consensual. The reconciliation of national positions can often 
only be achieved through laborious compromise, which are difficult for the 
layman to decipher. The incessant haggling which characterises Community 
decision-making appears to leave little room for the public interest to be taken 
into account. In most cases, only the societal groups who are directly affected 
by the Community measures are sufficiently motivated to follow the long path 
taken by a draft piece of legislation. \ 
I 
Both the manner in which issues are approached and the bargaining to which 
these issues are subjected contribute to reinforce the technocratic image of the 
Community. The European political system is primarily seen' as a closed shop, 
with membership confined to experts espousing the defence of national or 
sectoral interests, and not as a political arena within which different conceptions 
of the public interest can be aired and discussed. A real political deficit 
superimposes itself on the democratic deficit.12 But can it be otherwise, given 
the intrinsic diversity of the Community? 
( 
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The Consequences of Maastricht 
The Maastricht Treaty has tried to overcome the difficulties outlined above by 
consolidating the institutional position of the European Parliament. This is 
reflected in the establishment, for the first time in the history of European 
integration, of true legislative co-decision making: in a number of areas, 
agreement between Parliament and Council is now required for the adoption of 
Community acts. At the same time, the cooperation and the assent procedures, 
both introduced by the Single Act, have seen their scope enlarged.13 Though 
clearly indicative of an overall trend, this in itself falls short of a proper 
Parliamentary system. However, the Maastricht Treaty also modified the 
conditions under which the Commission is appointed. This further change, which 
has so far gone largely unnoticed, possesses the potential to considerably alter 
the balance of power within the Community. Given its importance it deserves 
a more detailed scrutiny. 
Towards a Parliamentary System? 
The idea of associating Parliament with the appointment of Commission 
members had been circulating for a number of years - well before the present 
day criticisms levelled at the Brussels' bureaucracy had begun to emerge. Over 
a decade ago, it featured in the Solemn Declaration on European Union adopted 
in Stuttgart in June 1983 and it has always been high on the list of Parliament's 
demands. 
Admittedly, since the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament, 
it has been the custom for the newly-appointed President of the Commission to 
be heard by Parliament's enlarged Bureau and for the Commission to present its 
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programme to the full house shortly after it took office. Despite the fact that 
debate on this programme ended in a vote, respect for the forms of 
parliamentarianism could scarcely conceal the reality: the political will the 
Commission emerged from was the national governments', and not the 
Parliament's. 
The procedure introduced by the new Article 158 introduces a number of 
· radical changes. It is only following consultation with the Parliament that 
national governments can nominate the person they plan to appoint as 
Commission President. Commission members are then nominated by Member 
States in consultation with the president designate. However, the whole body 
must be given a vote of approval before taking office. In other words, the 
. Commission must, as in classical parliamentary systems, have the confidence of 
a parliamentary majority. 
This two-stage procedure, singling out the Commission president while formally 
recognizing his influence on choosing the body's members, should contribute to 
establishing his authority over his peers. Parliament's influence has been further 
increased by the link established as of 1995 between Parliament's term and that 
of the Commission. A six month gap has been arranged between European 
elections and the setting up of the Commission, to enable the newly elected 
Parliament to take part in nominating the latter. Any significant changes in 
Parliament's composition can thus be reflected at Commission level. 
The model is somewhat reminiscent of the practice followed in many 
parliamentary systems, where nomination of the head of government precedes 
formation of the cabinet, for which the prime minister designated by the head 
of State is often compelled to negotiate with the leaders of the main parties in 
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the majority. The difficulties which have surrounded the appointment of the 
Santer Commission have shown that Parliament firmly intends to influence the 
distribution of portfolios among Commissioners. Influent MEPs are even 
advocating an evolution towards a model of "Parliamentary Commission", in 
which the composition and programme of the European Commission would 
reflect the will of the Parliamentary majority.14 Be that as it may, in the future, 
the Commission - just like the executive of many parliamentary federations -
will derive its legitimacy from a twofold source: the Member States on the one 
hand, and Parliament on the other. 
This development lends new importance to the possibility of a vote of censure, 
provided for in Article 144. Hitherto the possibility had remained theoretical, 
since nothing prevented Member State governments from confirming the 
members of a censured Commission in their posts, as Parliament enjoyed no real 
influence over the choice of Commission members. Things will be different in 
the future. In the case of a censure vote, Parliament's new prerogativees will 
enable it to ensure that its grounds for censuring a Commission will be taken 
into account in appointing a new one. 
The import of these changes is considerable. They augur a deep transformation 
in the nature of the relationship between Parliament and the Commission. The 
Commission will henceforth be fully responsible to Parliament, the influence of 
which will be felt over all its activities, be they administrative or legislative. 
This will presumably set up a knock-on effect which will reverberate through 
the whole set of institutional relationships. For instance, one can envisage 
Parliament playing a much greater role in the cooperation procedure, where to 
date the Commission has been a necessary intermediary between Parliament and 
Council. Likewise, given the relationships that are bound to grow up between 
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Parliament and Commission, the right given to Parliament to request the 
Commission to 'submit any appropriate proposal on matters in which it 
considers that a Community act is required'15 may be seen as corning close to 
a true right of initiative. 
These new developments are certainly not without their limits. Both the 
Parliament's and the Commission's role are fairly limited in monetary policy, 
where the lion's share goes to the Central Bank. Similarly, censure is ruled out 
in relation to the Commission's activities in the context of the two principal 
inter-governmental aspects of the Treaty, i.e. the newly-established common 
foreign and security policy, and cooperation in the field of 'justice and home 
affairs. However important these two reservations may be, it nonetheless appears 
that the Treaty's signatories, in their desire to establish the Community's 
democratic legitimacy, have radically modified the balance of power between 
Commission and Parliament. 
Centre-Periphery Relationships 
So far, most of my remarks have focussed on the horizontal axis of the 
institutional system, namely the relations between Community institutions. It 
would however be unlikely for the reshuffling of the cards among the 
Community institutions to take place without affecting relations between the 
Community and its Member States. 
Although the model we can see emerging from the institutional workshop of 
Maastricht is still a vague outline, it appears clear that the parliamentary system, 
in which the executive is derived from a majority whose confidence it must 
keep, served as the reference point throughout the discussion on institutional 
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matters. Should this evolution be confirmed, centre-periphery relations would be 
-------- ---~--- ------------
radically altered. 
The linkage between Parliament and Commission is in fact likely to transform 
the latter considerably. One of the main features of the Commission as designed 
by the original Treaties is its mixed nature as a multi-national and multi-party 
body. Even under a strong presidency like that of Jacques Delors, the 
Commission has remained a collegiate body devoid of clear political colour. 
This feature, while largely responsible for the technocratic profile of integration 
that some decry, has undoubtedly been a trump card in its relationships with 
Member States. Its neutrality prevents the Commission from being perceived as 
too alien a body in national capitals despite the institutional autonomy it enjoys. 
More generally, the weakness of party politics at European level has allowed to 
preserve the consensual character of Community decision-making.16 
It is unlikely that matters will continue in this vein, as the Commission will 
henceforth need the support of a parliamentary majority. The resulting 
politicization in both membership and programme will perhaps make things 
clearer to the European voter, hereby reducing the "political deficit" discussed 
above. However, this may well be at the expense of good relations with national 
governments. 
For instance, imagine the two political groups that currently dominate Parliament 
- the Christian Democratic EPP and the Socialist Group - coming to an 
agreement on a government programme. What might the relations be between 
a Commission born of such an agreement and, say, a Conservative government 
in London or a Gaullist-dominated one in Paris? Neither would be likely to see 
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the new Commission as in any way 'theirs', even if, as prescribed by Article 
157, it contains at least one of their countrymen. 
The emergence of a party logic at Commission level is also likely to have 
effects on its institutional role. Its function as a mediator among national 
interests, and in particular its mission as a defender of small States, would be 
made more difficult by such a drift. This is not to say that either function would 
necessarily disappear. The experience of parliamentary federations shows that 
party affiliation and representative logic are not, properly speaking, 
incompatible. However, in the event of a conflict the former tends to gain the 
upper hand over the latterP 
The core of the problem seems to be a conflict between two kinds of logic. The 
logic underlying most parliamentary systems is majoritarian: a majority is to be 
formed in Parliament and reflected in the composition of the executive. Party 
lines tend to matter a great deal, as the executive can stay in office only as long 
as it retains the confidence of its majority. In contrast, federalism is primarily 
a form of "anti-majoritarian" government.18 The component units often owe 
their separate existence to the necessity of avoiding a domination of minorities 
by the majority; the same concern has frequently led to the setting up of 
mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing that even at national level, decisions require 
a fairly large degree of consensus. The truth is that these two lines of logic are 
not easy to reconcile, as suggested by the experience of parliamentary 
federations like Canada or Australia. 
Moreover, the majoritarian logic that characterizes parliamentary systems tends 
to promote the development of a horizontal rationality within the central 
institutions: coordination among the various departments of the executive and 
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relationships with Parliament move ahead of representing the interests of the 
federation's components. This clearly does not simplify relationships between 
the various levels of power. A number of studies attribute the relative stability 
of American federalism to the existence of a tight network of intergovernmental 
relationships - the 'marble cake' described by Morton Grodzins19 - in whic~ 
decisions are taken by specialists in a given area, without too much regard for 
questions of formal powers, or party considerations. By contrast, the 'horizontal' 
rationality typifying parliamentary regimes, particularly when combined with 
partisan antagonism, tends to give accrued importance to jurisdiction concerns, 
thereby rendering intergovernmental cooperation more difficult.20 
Naturally, the kind of parliamentary model that will emerge at Community level 
will ultimately depend on a number of variables that still remain indeterminate 
- be it the cohesiveness of political parties or the type of coalition that will be 
formed. Yet, if the Parliament-Commission axis is as stout as the Treaty seems 
to want it to be, there is a real risk of seeing tensions develop between the 
Community and its Member States. 
As far as we can judge, however, the danger of a major confrontation arising 
seems low in the near future. The Council, in which national interests are 
dominant, retains a central role in all legislative procedures. Furthermore, many 
procedures require the vote of a majority of European Parliament members, in 
practice amounting to a two-thirds majority of votes cast; these two conditions 
are even combined in the case of a censure motion. This will probably 
necessitate the maintenance of a 'grand coalition' in which a large number of 
diverse interests will be represented. However, the lack of a body charged with 
reconciling the various interests is liable to be keenly felt. Moreover, the 
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institutional changes which are currently being considered might further 
accentuate the evolution towards a more clearly majoritarian profile. 
Towards a non-Ml\ioritarian Avenue 
The 1996 debate is expected to revolve around the question of how the 
Community's structure must be reformed in order to make possible an 
enlargement to Eastern European countries without compromising the efficiency 
of the institutional machinery. In this context, many of the reforms considered 
in Community circles - a downsizing of the Commission, ·which would no 
longer include representatives of all Member States, the generalization and 
simplification of majority voting, a reform of the Presidency which would de 
facto limit the role of smaller countries21 - all point in the same direction, that 
of a strengthening of the majoritarian features of the European political system. 
Unsurprisingly, smaller countries have a certain concern in this respect.22 
If these proposals are fleshed out, the Community will find itself in a 
paradoxical situation. On the one hand, by increasing the European Parliament's 
powers and by reinforcing the majoritarian element, it will have contributed to 
establishing the Community's democratic legitimacy, while furnishing a remedy 
for the political deficit I mentioned earlier. On the other hand, one of the pillars 
of the Community edifice, the representation of Member States, will have been 
seriously weakened. Do the two necessarily go hand in hand, or can we 
conceive of a system that would allow these two fundamental aspects of the 
legitimacy of any divided-power system to be reconciled? To my mind, this is 
one of the major questions that will have to be addressed in the forthcoming 
institutional debate. 
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The Community's twofold legitimacy 
As noted in the first part of this article, for about three decades, European 
integration has primarily derived its legitimacy from the consent of the States 
which had given birth to it. Post-Maastricht developments have revealed t4e 
dissatisfaction of public opinion, and its yearning to be listened to whenever 
Europe has to address major issues, an increasingly frequent occurrence. The 
state _l~~itimacy that dominated the early years must therefore be supplemented 
~~y another kind of legitimacy, better suited to the current development of the 
Community's political system. 
In today's European politics, public decisions are generally perceived as 
legitimate when they are adopted by institutions whose democratic character is 
recognized. A substantial part of the opposition met by the EC in recent years 
can be explained by the fact that it was perceived of as insufficiently 
democratic. Only by bringing it closer to standards of European democracy can 
one hope to restore its credibility in the eyes of the general public. The days 
when European integration could be regarded essentially as a "foreign affair", 
whose plot was followed by a handful of people, are over. 
However, the parallel with the legitimacy of domestic institutions is far from 
complete. Europe's vocation is not to become a centralized super-state. The EC 
is the product of a pooling of sovereignties in a limited sphere; it is 
superimposed on the States, but cannot altogether replace them. The Community 
is an extremely diverse gathering - it will be even more so after enlargement -
in which national traditions remain very strong. In a world where economic and 
technical transformations have strong centripetal effects, this diversity can be a 
strong asset, as long as it does not result in boundless competition among states. 
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One of the Community's historical missions is precisely to allow the peaceful 
coexistence of different national models. Moreover, states still enjoy a primary 
allegiance in national politics. The Community will only be able to consolidate 
its own authority if it shows sufficient respect for states, and for n~ti()nal 
spedfid:ties: ··· 
It therefore follows that the democratization of the European political system can 
only be achieved through the setting up of a&!~ali$1, ~j;m model, 
in which states as such will be called upon to play an important role. State 
!e~~~~I __ ~_ti __ ~emocratic legitimacy are the two pillars on which the 
Community's institutional system must rest. Only a balance between the two 
will ensure the stability of the whole construction. Changes operated on one 
front should therefore avoid becoming a source of stress on the other. 
Institutional Corollaries 
Given the size of this article, it is not possible to develop here in full the 
essential features of a n.()!l:~ajoritarian model. Let me however point to a J~~ . 
elements which ought to be considered in the construction of such a model. 
As indicated above, the strengthening of the European Parliament and the 
reduction in the number of commissioners, especially if combined, are likely to 
undermine the representative character of the Community executive, and 
therefore its relations with national capitals. For the time being, _ap. agreement 
between the European Council and the Parliament is necessary to give birth to 
a new Commission. Yet this body will be responsible before Parliament only, 
which may ultimately lead to an unwelcome politicization. Such an evolution 
would be a matter of concern, as the Commission enjoys important institutional 
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privileges, such as a monopoly of initiative in many areas, or .a guarantee that 
its proposals will be modified only by unanimous decision of the Council. Such 
privileges made sense in a situation where the Commission enjoyed the 
confidence of the Member States, but they could become a source of imbalance 
if the Commission's ties with national societies were to be loosened. 
[
The Community's double legitimacy can only be preserved through some 
correctin.· g .. device. The remedy here might be }~o~~t.<>re the balance between our 
~o pil!ars, by making the Commission responsible also before the European 
-~o_11ncil of Ministers. Naturally, the same conditions £_ould be required (or a 
censure vote as for the appointment of the Commission. Even if censure remains 
·-·~------·-
an exceptional event, such a reform would be likely to affect the Commission's 
behaviour in its day-to-day activities. It might therefore usefully counterbalance 
the Parliament's growing influence, while softening the effect of a reduction in 
the number of Commissioners: a country that had no "representative" in the 
executive would thus have a way of ensuring that what is decided in Brussels 
is not detrimental to its interests. 
As regards ~s111tive_ proct;:_<iures, the balance still leans in favour of the 
Member States. In most instances, except in the new co-decision procedure 
established by the Maastricht Treaty, the last say still belongs to the Council of 
Ministers, while Parliament remains completely excluded from certain areas, 
ranging from commercial policy to free movement of capital. Here the idea of 
double legitimacy suggests that Parliament's role should be enhanced. The aim 
here would be the establishment of a fully-fledged bicameral system, in which 
legislative power would be shared between two assemblies - one directly elected, 
the European Parliament, and the other, the Council of Ministers, composed of 
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members of national governments - much like the German Bundesrat, which 
brings together members of Liinder government. 
Turning to _decisi()n-making procedures, it is often asserted that a Community 
of 25 members or more could not survive without a generalization of majority 
' 
voting and a lowering of the threshold for majority decisions - which is 
currently around 70% of the (weighted) votes cast in the Council of 
Ministers.23 Undoubtedly, the problem is important. Decision~making, which was 
already cumbersome and lengthy in the Community of twelve, could be nearly 
paralyzed if Community membership were to double without the necessary 
adjustments having been made. This fear has led the Institutional Committee of 
the European Parliament to suggest in its draft European Constitution that all 
decisions should require a double majority in the Council of Ministers: a 
majority of states, representing at least a majority of the Community's 
population.24 Such a solution would imply great advantages, if only because of 
its transparency: European citizens would know that no decision can be taken 
by a minority of States, or against the will of the representatives of the majority 
of the population. Yet, when considering the kind of coalitions possible, one 
realizes pretty soon that, as most new applicants for membership are small states 
(and some micro-states), !~e ~umber of minimum-winning coalitions would be 
very high. In other words, there would be a serious risk of drifting towards a 
pattern of strictly majoritarian decisions. 
I have suggested elsewhere a form of ''alarm bell" mechanism,25 enabling a 
significant minority of states (say, three Member States, representing a minimum 
share of the Community's population) to block a proposal that would in their 
view threaten their vital interests. Such a veto would only be overcome if the 
measure at hand was confirmed by an enlarged majority, in order to avoid the 
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possibility that an indiscriminate use of this 
. weapon could result in a 1 paralysiS of decision-making. comp ete 
Surely, other techniques are conceivable whi h 
character of C . . . c would preserve the consensual 
ommuruty deciSton-makin 0 h 
. g. t er approaches, such as the 
delelgation of powers to autonomous institutions, insulated from the electoral 
eye e, could be envisaged 26 M 
. y concem here is not to advocate any p ti ul 
mode of constitutional en . . ar c ar 
gmeenng, but rather to stress the need of . 
a majoritarian drif h preventing 
t t at would compromise the stability of the Community. 
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Conclusion 
The Maastricht ratification debates have seen an unexpected intrusion of public 
opinion in Community affairs. In such a context, it seems difficult to accept the 
idea that the EC, like any international organization, derives its legitimation 
from the sovereign will of its member-States. The weak legitimacy basis of 
European institutions, which was at most a matter of academic discussion until 
recently, has suddenly become a dominant issue in European politics. To many, 
the strengthening of the European Parliament, which has been one of the 
dominant elements of the last ten years, seems to appear as a natural response 
to this new situation. If the people want their voice to be heard, then let their 
representatives play a greater role in the shaping in Community policies. In such 
a perspective, Parliament's institutional position, still weak in some respects, and 
the persistent weakness of European parties, unavoidably appear as a matter of 
concern. 
At the same time, a number of institutional adjustments are being considered in 
view of an Eastern enlargement of the Community, which appears unavoidable 
in the medium to long term. Most of these adjustments, dictated by efficiency 
concerns- or, to be more precise, by a legitimate desire to limit decision costs-
would in fact be likely reinforce the rnajoritarian character of decision-making. 
Although I do not disagree with the analysis that inspires these two sets of 
proposals, I have tried to show in the present article the risks involved in a 
majoritarian option. The parliamentary system, which is dominant in Western 
Europe,27 seems to have been chosen as a model for the institutional 
development of the European Community. Yet, this model, because of its 
majoritarian aspects, is ill-adapted to the needs of a hybrid creature like the EC, 
characterized by great diversity and by strong national feelings. 
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That majoritarian logic may have adverse effects in decentralized systems is by 
no means a new remark. Discussing the various models that could inspire the 
American Constitution, James Madison warned two centuries ago that 
"[w]hen a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular 
government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both_ 
the public good and the rights of other citizens. To ensure the public 
good, and private rights, against the danger of such faction, and at the 
same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government is 
then the great object to which our enquiries are directed .... "28 
Replace the word "faction" by the word "party", more fashionable today, and 
you will have a good description of the danger involved in the majoritarian 
option. The development of party politics at European level might be detrimental 
'"------
to centre-periphery relations, which are crucial for the stability of the 
Community. Seen in this light, the current weakness of European parties, 
lamented by some, may appear as a disguised blessing. Yet it is far from clear 
that the situation will remain unchanged if the institutional system encourages 
greater cohesion, and there are reasons to believe that Parliament's new 
prerogatives in relation to the appointment of the Commission may indeed 
provide that kind of incentive. 
Certainly, Parliament's involvement in this process must be hailed as a positive 
development, given the legitimacy deficit of the EC. But the implications of this 
change ought to be properly assessed and, if need be, corrected. The same is 
true of the changes considered in view of pending enlargement. 
Madison himself wisely suggested that "factions" could not be avoided, and that 
-~e J>roblem was rather to control their impact. 2r Thus, as regards the EC, the 
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"great object" that will have to be addressed in the institutional debates to come 
is strikingly similar to the one he described: to carve out an institutional system 
that will bring a remedy to the current legitimacy crisis of the Community, 
without ~t the same time exposing it to the dangers of majoritarian solutions. 
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Further Readings 
There is no shortage of literature on the institutions· of the European 
Community. Given the rapid pace of change in the last ten years, readers should 
focus on recent works such as: 
-Jean-Louis Quermonne, Le systeme politique de !'Union europeenne: ~nd ed. 
(Paris: Montchrestien, Collection "Clefs", 1994). A valuable descnption of 
European institutions and decision-making processes. 
- David O'Keeffe and P.M. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty (London: Wiley Chancery Law, 1994). 
- Renaud Dehousse (ed.), Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? 
(Munich: Law Books in Europe, 1994). . 
Two collections of essays on the innovations introduced by the Maastncht 
Treaty. 
- Joseph Weiler, 'The Transformation of Europe', Yale Law Journal, vol. 100 
(1991), 2403-2483. . . . . 
One of the few systematic analyses of the mstituttonal evolution of the European 
Community since its inception. 
- Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preference and Power in the European Community: a 
Uberal Intergovernmental View', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 31 
(1993) 473-524. 
- Renaud Dehousse and Giandomenico Majone, 'The Institutional Dynamics of 
European Integration: From the Single Act to the Ma~stricht Treaty' in ~tephe~ 
Martin (ed.), The Construction of Europe -Essays zn Honour of Emzle Noel 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 91-112. . . . . 
Two contrasting views on the dynanucs of mstitutional change. 
There is also an abundant literature, mostly of Canadian origin, on the structural 
tension between federalism and the majoritarian logic of parliamentary systems. 
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-Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties 3rd ed. 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1980) provides one of the most complete surveys of 
the problem. 
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